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ANTICLERICALISM AND PUBLIC SPACE IN REVOLUTIONARY JALISCO*

The anticlerical attacks of radical nineteenth-century liberals provoked the Church and aided the rise of confessional politics from continental Europe to revolutionary Mexico. In the European case, Stathis Kalyvas has recently proposed that such anticlerical liberalism was often moved by two distinctive motives, one narrow and political, the other broad and institutional.¹ These motives can be associated with the concepts of tactic and strategy as laid out by Michel de Certeau.² Working from both conceptual pairings, we can characterize anticlericalism sometimes as a political tactic, responding to conjunctural circumstances, and other times as an institutional strategy, plotting out a terrain and a path on which to forge present and future power relationships. This sort of conceptualization, I believe, is also well-suited to analyses of revolutionary Mexico. Nonetheless, for the distinction between “political-tactical” and “institutional-strategic” to be helpful, historians also need to place anticlericalism within the confusing logic of destruction and reconstruction inherent to Mexico’s revolutionary process.

In this context, a comparison of the Diéguez and Zuno regimes in the western state of Jalisco may offer valuable insights regarding the varying form, impact, and meaning of revolutionary anticlericalism. In the first case, Manuel M. Diéguez governed Jalisco as an occupying general during the most violent phase of the civil war, and subsequently as an elected governor during the initial stage of reconstruction (1914-19).³ Diéguez’s anticlerical-

* The author thanks Matthew Butler for important suggestions and timely editing, all of which greatly improved this article.

¹ Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 172.

² Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California, 1988), p. xix.

³ Manuel M. Diéguez was governor and military commander of Jalisco from Jun. 1914-May 1917, during which he took leave of absence on nine occasions due to military exigencies; he was constitutional governor from Jun. 1917-Feb. 1919, during which period he was on leave for military reasons from late 1917 until early 1919, more than half of his elected period. *Manuel M. Diéguez y el constitucionalismo en Jalisco (documentos)*, ed. Mario Aldana Rendón (Guadalajara: Gobierno de Jalisco, 1986).

ism was *tactical*, thus political, part of a campaign to occupy and control the political sphere in a state not yet dominated by liberal revolutionaries. As a result, he was ultimately willing to negotiate the limits of his anticlericalism if this allowed him to consolidate his political control. By contrast, José Guadalupe Zuno ran the state during a period of revolutionary reconstruction and state-building, first as mayor of Guadalajara, the capital, and then as governor (1922-26).⁴ Zuno's anticlericalism was *strategic*, thus institutional, part of a broad reconstruction policy in a state now controlled politically by anticlerical revolutionaries. Zuno, like president Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-28), applied anticlerical policies that were intended to secularize the political sphere and marginalize opposition politics rather than to curb clerical privilege per se. By comparing and contrasting these *dieguista* and *zunista* anticlericalisms, I hope to offer new insights into the construction of anticlericalism in revolutionary Mexico.

Ideological questions of belief and conviction remain important here, as Alan Knight reminds us.⁵ Thus, I do not distinguish between merely "pragmatic," as opposed to "ideological," anticlericalisms, but between the different ways in which a "lived" revolutionary anticlericalism was implemented. Thus, on the one hand, we may identify the primary characteristics of dieguista anticlericalism: a short-term, informal, *inter bellum*, and pre-constitutional, clerophobia—shooting clergy, levying punitive fines, smashing icons, letting soldiers run riot in the sacristy—which was designed to crush clerical opposition to the revolution and punish the clergy for complicity with the old regime. In 1920s Jalisco, on the other hand, we see the development of a legal-bureaucratic, distinctively *zunista* anticlericalism—a neo-*patronato* that focused on regulating worship, fixing ecclesiastical discipline, suppressing Catholicism's extension into the social sphere, and defining the character of Church property. Diéguez and Zuno shared an underlying hatred of clergy. Yet visceral anticlericalism could be contingent, a tactic deployed to control the public sphere, or strategic, a legalistic framework meant to secularize it. Circumstances, too, imposed constraints on what these chiefs could achieve: Diéguez was in no position to make structural changes; even Zuno's tactical moves—lashing out at the Church during the *delahuertista* rising—were part of a larger, institutional project. Thus, we are seeking to outline distinctive *modes*, rather than philosophical

⁴ José Guadalupe Zuno was mayor of Guadalajara from May 1922-Apr. 1923, and governor of Jalisco from May 1923-Mar. 1926, when he was forced out after charges (later dropped) that he had been involved in the de la Huerta rebellion.

⁵ Alan Knight, "The Mentality and Modus Operandi of Revolutionary Anticlericalism," in *Faith and Impiety in Revolutionary Mexico*, ed. Matthew Butler (New York: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 21-56.

degrees, of revolutionary anticlericalism. We should remember, too, that we are dealing with a gradual, decade-long evolution here, and that these varieties of anticlericalism were to some extent concurrent. This was especially true in the final years of the dieguista administration (1917-19), which in some clear ways prefigured the “mature” revolutionary anticlericalism of the zunista 1920s.

CIVIL WAR AND MILITARY OCCUPATION, 1914-1916

From July 1914, Sonoran revolutionaries and leaders of the archdiocese of Guadalajara became entrenched in what might be considered a Gramscian war of position.⁶ While the *carrancista* press told of a crusade against clerical privilege, the archdiocese described a campaign to wipe out the Church. Both exaggerated: nonetheless, the carrancistas’ initial assault on the Church was broad, and swept south through major cities including Guadalajara, Tepic, Durango, Monterrey, Ciudad Victoria, Tampico, Veracruz, and Mexico City. The stylistic repertoire of carrancista anticlericalism was profanatory, iconoclastic, occasionally murderous, deliberately random, vindictive, and unsettling: generals jailed priests, occupied churches, seminaries, and schools, and shut down the Catholic press;⁷ sacred effigies were marched out of cathedrals and executed by firing squad in acts of revolutionary justice; horses were tethered to choir stalls, and soldiers billeted in sacristies. In Guadalajara, vicar general Manuel Alvarado complained that many religious buildings were being used as barracks by July 1914: the preparatory and theological seminaries, the Sacred Heart College, the Holy Spirit Vocational School, the retreats at San Sebastián de Analco, and the churches of Our Lady of Guadalupe and Our Lady of Afflictions. The archbishop’s residence, the printing press of the Catholic daily, *El Regional*, and all schools affiliated with the Church were later seized. Alvarado estimated that these measures disrupted the education of 20,000 poor schoolchildren, many of whom received free food, clothing, and instruction.⁸

⁶ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1989), pp. 229-235.

⁷ United States Department of State, National Archive and Records Administration, records relating to the internal affairs of Mexico, 1910-29 (henceforth SD); communications to secretary of state, all 1914, from Hanna, Monterrey, 23 Jul. (812.00/12591); Canada, Veracruz, 27 Jul. and 13 Dec. (812.00/12634, 812.00/14090); Hamm, Durango, 8 Aug. (812.00/12885); Canova, Mexico City, 21 Aug. (812.00/12959); Sillman, Mexico City, 24 Aug. (812.00/12983); Davis, Guadalajara, 31 Oct. (812.00/13720). H. L. Hall to Davis, Mexico City, 1 Oct. 1914 (812.00/27431).

⁸ *Memorial del cabildo metropolitano y clero de la arquidiócesis de Guadalajara, al C. Presidente de la República Mexicana, Dn. Venustiano Carranza; y voto de adhesión y obediencia al Ilmo. y Revmo. Sr. Arzobispo, Dr. y Mtro. Dn. Francisco Orozco y Jiménez*, Apr. 1918, p. 4, in Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco (BPE), *miscelánea* 783/7.

The destruction or effacing of common religious symbols was another tactic adopted by Diéguez's military administration during the fall and winter of 1914. The government removed the "*Ave Maria*" inscriptions customarily placed over the doorways of houses, stores, tenements, and schools; saints' names and images disappeared from streets, plazas, markets, and towns.⁹ In another vivid example of symbolic violence, the drum corps of Sonora's 13th battalion skinned their drums with 300-year-old parchment from cathedral choral books.¹⁰ In a series of puritanical moves, the regime suppressed Christmas holidays in Guadalajara's schools and banned confessionals and the Viaticum. Diéguez's legalization of divorce, and his rifling of the curial archives—papers detailing 300 "sexual crimes" committed by priests were allegedly discovered in a strong box—constituted further revolutionary attempts to call time on clerical influence.¹¹

Rumor and slander were other weapons. Anticlerical scare stories left the priesthood under no illusions that it was identified as a reactionary group, subject to revolutionary justice. On 22 July 1914, the *Boletín Militar*—the carrancistas' official publication in Jalisco—claimed that the clergy was conspiring to lead an insurrection against the military government. On 21 July, soldiers detained any priests they could find and jailed 135, including the bishop of Tehuantepec. Military authorities closed churches across the city, alleging that priests had stockpiled arms there.¹² The priests were freed without charge on 29 July after paying a 200,000 peso "fine." The *Boletín* continued to report the so-called "sanctuary plot," but nobody was prosecuted.¹³ The priests' release was perhaps motivated by public expressions of support for the Church, made by civilian groups, including teachers and public servants, and mostly comprising women.¹⁴

The veracity of the conspiracy has never been convincingly demonstrated:¹⁵ indeed, the evidence suggests that it was an invention of Diéguez's propagandists. Firstly, no additional evidence has been discovered that would corroborate the charges made in the *Boletín Militar*. Secondly, vicar

⁹ *Memorial*, p. 10.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹¹ Moisés González Navarro, *Cristeros y agraristas en Jalisco* (5 vols. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2000-2), vol. 1, pp. 188, 251-252, 261.

¹² Jean Meyer, *La cristiada* (3 vols. Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1973-4), vol. 2, p. 77. *Boletín Militar*, 22-24, 26, and 29 Jul. 1914.

¹³ *Memorial*, p. 6; *Boletín Militar*, Jul. 29 1914.

¹⁴ *Boletín Militar*, Jul. 29, 4 Aug., and 18 Aug. 1914.

¹⁵ For a contrasting interpretation, see Mario Aldana Rendón, *Del reyismo al nuevo orden constitucional, 1910-1917. Tomo 1. Jalisco desde la Revolución* (Guadalajara: Gobierno del Estado, 1987), pp. 218-221.

general Alvarado felt confident enough to write to Carranza in 1918, when he dismissed the charges as a pretext to sack the churches.¹⁶ Third, no other cases of Catholic clergy planning armed rebellions were substantiated during the revolution's armed phase. On the contrary, even during the *cristero* rebellion, the institutional Church opposed armed resistance and harped on the pauline theme of obedience to the powers-that-be. Fourth, general Amado Aguirre, Diéguez's chief-of-staff, was ordered by Obregón to search the cathedral for money during the first days of the carrancistas' occupation of Guadalajara, and recorded nothing remotely subversive in his exhaustive memoirs. Nor did he once mention the sanctuary plot. One would suppose that an anti-carrancista plot involving 100 priests would warrant some sort of mention in an account of the occupation of Guadalajara.¹⁷ Fifth, and most importantly, Diéguez's troops executed nobody.¹⁸ Not one priest went before a firing squad, even though carrancistas had few qualms about shooting priests in other circumstances.

Pelotón y paredón—the firing squad and pock-marked adobe wall used for staging executions—were integral parts of the cultural idiom of the era, and especially in 1914-15, the revolution's middle years.¹⁹ An armed clerical plot would have been foiled with exemplary violence. Yet the playing-out of the so-called conspiracy seems more reminiscent of another idiom of violence characteristic of the period: extortion. This, too, was part of the revolution's politico-military *modus operandi*, and was not exclusive to carrancismo. Furthermore, such extortion—often masquerading as taxation—was noted frequently during the early occupation of Guadalajara. In November 1914, for example, the U.S. consul reported the carrancistas' discovery of a clandestine mass celebrated in a private home: 25 men were arrested, charged with conspiring against the government, and subsequently fined 1,000 pesos each in exchange for their freedom.²⁰

The most notorious anticlerical incident during the carrancista occupation of Guadalajara—the murder of Father David Galván—occurred after a pre-dawn raid by the villista general, Julián Medina, on the city barracks. The “*albazo de Medina*,” as the attack is known, was staged on 30 January 1915, with the objective of capturing or killing Jalisco's carrancista leadership. The surprise attack failed, although not before a running battle between vil-

¹⁶ *Memorial*, p. 6.

¹⁷ Amado Aguirre, *Mis memorias de campaña* (Mexico City: INEHRM, 1985), pp. 62-65.

¹⁸ *Memorial*, p. 6.

¹⁹ Jorge Aguilar Mora, *Una muerte sencilla, justa, y eterna: cultura y guerra durante la revolución mexicana* (Mexico City: ERA, 1990).

²⁰ SD 812.00/13760, Davis to secretary of state, 5 Nov. 1914.

listas and carrancistas across Guadalajara. After the assault, Galván was executed by a carrancista captain named Enrique Vera: the execution took place outside the civil hospital, near the Belén cemetery.

Beyond this there is confusion. If carrancista propagandists sought to stress Galván's "reactionary" links to villismo, Catholic writers stressed his priestly courage on the battlefield and his Christian charity to all men. Some writers claim that Galván was not apprehended during the albazo, but during the battle of La Junta (18 January), which he witnessed deliberately in order to tend wounded carrancistas and villistas. Anacleto González Flores affirms that Galván cycled to La Junta from Guadalajara to administer extreme unction to the wounded.²¹ Vicente Camberos Vizcaíno adds that pious neighbors buried Galván's body and brought stones from the river to mark where he was shot.²² Catholics thus appropriated both the execution site and Galván's memory as sources of popular devotion: today a chapel housing his remains stands nearby.²³

Galván's martyrdom has been part of official Church doctrine since the priest's canonization in 2000. The official history adds explicitly christological touches to earlier lionizing accounts: now Galván is not merely a courageous priest but one touched with sanctity. A recent hagiography, which received the imprimatur and has now become popular in Guadalajara, has him walking to his death full of salvific intent, knowingly referring to the Lord's Supper, and sharing out his worldly goods—coins and holy oil—with his executioners. In this version, Galván manfully refuses a blindfold and asks the firing squad to aim at his chest.²⁴ Earlier writers, too, invoked a masculine code of honor in the revolution: the valiant, and the holy, look death in the eye. In González Flores's account, Galván "awaited death, his

²¹ Anacleto González Flores, *La cuestión religiosa en Jalisco* (Mexico City: ACJM, 1920), p. 285; also, *El Obrero*, 31 Jan. and 7 Feb. 1920; 29 Jan. and 5 Feb. 1921; 5 Feb. and 11 Jun. 1922.

²² Vicente Camberos Vizcaíno, *Un hombre y una época, apuntes biográficos* (Mexico City: Jus, 1949), p. 219.

²³ Giving battlefield charity to afflicted revolutionaries was a key claim to sanctity for other *cristero* saints, including Rafael Guízar y Valencia, canonized in 2006. See Joaquín Antonio Peñalosa, *Rafael Guízar a sus órdenes* (Xalapa, 1995), pp. 7-9, 91-92.

²⁴ Ramiro Valdés Sánchez and Guillermo María Havers, *Tuyo es el reino: mártires mexicanos del siglo XX* (Guadalajara: Libros Católicos, n/d), pp. 19-23. These authors state that Galván was staying near Our Lady of Guadalupe church; hearing of the "albazo," he took holy oil and set out to help the wounded, stopping first at La Soledad church to ask another priest, José María Araiza, to join him. Walking past a barracks—probably the Cuartel Colorado Grande—the priests were taken prisoner. In jail Araiza lamented having no breakfast, to which Galván responded "soon we will eat at the table of the Lord." The priests confessed each other and, absolved of their sins, were marched out to the civil hospital. Knowing that death was imminent, Galván distributed his earthly possessions—coins and chrism—among the soldiers in emulation of Christ.

face to the sun, without batting an eye.”²⁵ Thus his murder at once parallels scripture and contemporary constructions of masculinity.

These crucifixion-style embellishments are later features: at the time, random violence was applied as part of both anticlerical and anti-villista policy. Many were marched before firing squads or hung from trees by cover of night during the three weeks following Diéguez’s second assault on the city in mid-January. In many cases, anonymous corpses were left behind for counting at daylight: “six [of them], well-dressed, on Liceo Street”; “three more in Alameda Park, two of whom, shot, were peons, while a third, well-dressed, was found hung.” On their way through Tlaquepaque in 1915, carrancistas shot 16. Returning to Guadalajara in 1915, Diéguez executed Luis Martínez Gracida and Manuel Santoscoy: civil servants during his first administration, both declined to leave Guadalajara with the carrancistas in December 1914 when Villa took the city (in Martínez Gracida’s case it probably did not help that his father was related through ties of *compadrazgo* to Porfirio Díaz).²⁶ Following the “albazo,” carrancistas also demolished a house in which they believed villistas were hiding: 22 men, women, and children perished inside. The same troops then fired on two workers exiting the nearby packing house: one was killed and another left wounded. Other workers rushed to explain that the men were not rebels but packers. When they asked permission to take the wounded man to a doctor, however, the commanding officer ordered a soldier to put his gun to the man’s forehead and blow his brains out. Elsewhere, a man carrying wood down a main street was shot dead “because he looked like a villista.” Finally, a spurned carrancista official had the offending woman’s boyfriend dragged to a barracks and shot.²⁷

The carrancistas’ early struggles to govern Guadalajara thus became confused as the dividing line between anticlericalism and the broader politics of military conquest was erased. Though some priests were martyred, a campaign of specifically *anticlerical* violence is delineated less easily than a generalized revolutionary terror, which claimed some priests among its many victims. Diéguez clearly saw the Church as a problem, and confronted a population that was “Catholic” in terms of religion and political conviction. But he was operating in a civil war, during 1914-15, when everything

²⁵ González Flores, *Cuestión religiosa*, p. 285.

²⁶ M. Cuzin, *Journal d’un français au Mexique, Guadalajara: 16 novembre 1914-6 juillet 1915* (Paris: J. L. Lesfargues, 1983), p. 93; J. Angel Moreno Ochoa, *Semblanzas revolucionarias: compendio del movimiento de liberación en Jalisco* (Guadalajara: Talleres Berni, 1965), p. 137.

²⁷ Davis to secretary of state, Guadalajara, 2 Feb. (SD 812.00/14486) and 19 Feb. 1915 (SD 812.00/14492). Will B. Davis, *Experiences and Observations of an American Consular Officer during the Recent Mexican Revolution* (Los Angeles: Wayside Press, 1920), pp. 81-92.

was up for grabs and there were enemies beside priests to fear. As in neighboring Michoacán, early constitutionalist anticlericalism in Jalisco derived in some measure from fear of the clergy as a constituent part of the local oligarchy, or as allies of villismo: hence priests, villistas, and porfirians alike were attacked.²⁸ The anticlericalism of 1914-15—when Diéguez occupied churches, deported foreign priests and nuns, and used the clergy as an emergency font from which to extract government finances—should be seen in this context. The shooting or hanging of several priests, alongside suspected villistas, was but a more extreme variation on this theme. Nonetheless, the intensity of this wartime phase did not last long. By 1916, Diéguez was establishing civilian governing councils, allowing priests to return, and avoiding the iconoclasm of 1914-15, so as to consolidate his regime and establish a shaky, but nonetheless operative, hegemony in Jalisco.

In this sense, Diéguez's religious policy from late 1915-16 followed a loosely Tocquevillian arc in which initial destruction gave way to the partial accommodation of some religious aspects of the old regime.²⁹ Such tactical mobility was common during this period, and gives us an insight into the pragmatic creativity of revolutionaries facing a unique political and military situation.³⁰ Indeed, it was only following the framing of the new constitution in 1917 that Diéguez and Jalisco's carrancista revolutionaries had a real opportunity to apply a systematic anticlerical policy, and could finally give greater political rein to their anticlerical proclivities. The constitution, with its call for formal elections, afforded revolutionaries new legitimacy; and gave them the tools to forge a similarly formal anticlericalism, one grounded less in executions and extortion than the patient planning of a society in which the rule of law might effectively limit the role of religion and the Church. This gradual transition was seen in Diéguez's second period of office from 1917-19; and fully in the governorship of José Guadalupe Zuno.

THE EMERGENCE OF A REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL PROJECT, 1917-1919

The tensions between Church and state were refocused through debates at the 1916 Querétaro constitutional congress. Several articles in the 1917 constitution immediately troubled the Church, and from their exile in Texas, Mexico's bishops protested the restrictions of the new constitution. Their

²⁸ Verónica Oikión Solano, *El constitucionalismo en Michoacán. El periodo de los gobiernos militares (1914-1917)* (Mexico City: Conaculta, 1992), pp. 248-256, 479-482.

²⁹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *El antiguo régimen y la revolución francesa* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2006), pp. 111-115.

³⁰ During his frequent absences in 1914-16, Diéguez left civilian subalterns in charge; such instability probably accentuated the tactical/political nature of Jaliscan anticlericalism during this period.

disagreement focused on the following areas: Article 3, which prohibited religious schools; Article 5, which established that the state would not recognize religious vows, since these were equated with servitude; Article 13, which denied legal status to religious institutions; Article 27, which prohibited religious associations from owning property and established that church buildings were property of the nation; and Article 130, which established that the state would exercise final authority above and beyond any other institution regarding religious worship.³¹

The constitution's anticlerical provisions dominated Church-state relations and the strategies of political Catholicism for ten years. Initially, conflicts were played out regionally between state and diocesan governments. This was partly because president Carranza (1917-20) was inclined to play down Church-state antagonisms by not enforcing the constitution's anticlerical articles. Similarly, the episcopate tacitly pushed conciliation. However, among carrancista governors and the bishops, there were widely divergent positions. In this regionally-defined context, the first important confrontation occurred in 1918: it involved Jalisco's interim governor, Manuel Bouquet Jr., and archbishop Francisco Orozco y Jiménez of Guadalajara.³² The historical relevance of the episode is that it involved the same issue that triggered the cristero rebellion of 1926-29—statutory regulation of clerical numbers and prerogatives, following revolutionary constitutional principle—with the difference that Church and state were able to come to a political solution. In the summer of 1926, this would no longer be possible.³³

The conflict centered on the state government's decision to interpret and apply Article 130 of the constitution. The resulting legislation was known as decree 1913: it restricted all religious associations, including organized Catholicism, to one priest and church per 5,000 faithful; and it required religious "professionals"—as priests were now redefined—to acquire state licences.³⁴ Decree 1913 was part of a generalized policy to subordinate all aspects of religious life to civil authority. Such institutional differentiation was not unique to Jalisco: yet Diéguez and Bouquet's bureaucratization of

³¹ *Carta pastoral del episcopado mexicano sobre la Constitución de 1917* (Acordada, Texas, 1917). Cf. Luis C. Balderrama, *El clero y el gobierno de México: apuntes para la historia de la crisis en 1926* (2 vols. Mexico City: Cuauhtémoc, 1927), vol. 2, pp. 19-32.

³² Bouquet was Diéguez's *gobernador sustituto* from Feb. 1918-Jan. 1919 (see Rendón, *Manuel M. Dieguez*). The intransigent Orozco y Jiménez was archbishop from 1912-36. See Vicente Camberos Vizcaíno, *Francisco el grande. Mons. Francisco Orozco y Jiménez. Biografía* (2 vols. Mexico City: Jus, 1966).

³³ Antonio Gómez Robledo, *Anacleto González Flores: el maestro* (Mexico City: Jus, 1947), p. 75.

³⁴ J. Ignacio Dávila Garibi, *Apuntes para la historia de la Iglesia en Guadalajara* (7 vols. Mexico City: Editorial Cultura, 1977), vol. 5, pp. 354-358.

sacerdotal offices and sudden extension of laicist principles to the Church's command structure provoked a particularly angry response from the Guadalajara faithful, who interpreted them as an unprecedented revolutionary assault on their religious traditions.

The problem was not merely legal, however, but a political challenge to the episcopate on the question of ecclesiastical discipline. Certain to oppose the measure, Orozco y Jiménez was arrested two days after the publication of decree 1913 on Diéguez's orders. The following day, he was escorted to Tampico by train. In Tampico, Orozco was charged with treason and strongly advised to leave Mexico, which he did.³⁵

Yet, unforeseen by Diéguez, the establishment of a new constitutional regime also generated a new Catholic political movement that mobilized large numbers of faithful in opposition to official restrictions on religious worship. In 1918, movements showing a variety of organizational forms emerged to protest against decree 1913 or in support of the exiled archbishop. Some were parish-, others community-based. All were articulated through Catholic lay organizations, such as the ACJM³⁶ and the UDCM.³⁷ All addressed different levels of civil government, from the town council and state congress to the governor's office and even President Carranza. Campaigns were waged through petitions, peaceful non-cooperation, and civil disobedience. The forms of the protests are of considerable importance in illustrating the broad appeal of Catholic demands. They also underscore the dialogic nature of revolutionary anticlericalism and the emerging Catholic political identity of the late 1910s and 1920s. In this subsequent period of militancy, politicized Catholics challenged revolutionaries and their governments in precisely those spheres that Mexican radicals considered proper to the revolution, not Catholicism.

When over 100 men were hauled off to jail for signing petitions, the Damas Católicas called for action. In a meeting with members of the ACJM and the Cervantes Academy (a school), Catholic women printed signs denouncing decree 1913 and the archbishop's enforced exile, and placed them in homes across the city.³⁸ Black bows also appeared over the doors and in the windows of homes as signs of mourning. The ACJM distributed

³⁵ BPE, miscelánea 783/7, "Apuntes para la historia," pp. 7-15; González Flores, *Cuestión religiosa*, pp. 310-312; Antonio Rius Facius, *De Don Porfirio a Plutarco: historia de la ACJM* (Mexico City: Jus, 1958), pp. 103-106; Camberos Vizcaíno, *Un hombre y una época*, pp. 254-255.

³⁶ Catholic Association of Mexican Youth.

³⁷ Union of Mexican Catholic Ladies.

³⁸ González Flores, *Cuestión Religiosa*, p. 315; Rius Facius, *De Don Porfirio*, p. 104.

fliers inviting city Catholics to congregate on the afternoon of 22 July at Diéguez's house. The invitation, attributed to González Flores, is telling:

To the Catholics of Guadalajara: You are invited, without distinction of class or sex, to gather on Monday the 22nd at 5 p.m., in the plaza of the train station, in order to demonstrate to General Manuel M Diéguez, in response to indications that he made to a commission of Catholic women, that the majority of Guadalajara is Catholic and does not agree with Decree 1913. Order is requested, and employers are asked to give leave to their employees.³⁹

Catholic sources claimed that there were as many as 35,000 people in the plaza and gardens, 15,000 on Calle Ferrocarril, and 10,000 along the plaza's sidestreets.⁴⁰

From his balcony, Diéguez told the crowd that their priests had misled them, for which he received loud cries of "no" and catcalls; and he continued by telling demonstrators that their priests were unwilling to abide by the law. Diéguez finished by warning the crowd that if they were Mexicans they had but two choices: abide by decree 1913, or leave the state as pariahs.⁴¹ Diéguez then withdrew from his balcony: shortly after, mounted police attacked, creating space in the plaza for policemen on foot. In the ensuing chaos, many Catholics were beaten. An eyewitness reported seeing a police commissar severely wound two women, both of whom died subsequently. Another woman was reportedly killed by a sabre-blow to the neck, while traders near the train station were arrested on charges of concealing weapons.⁴²

In Antonio Gómez Robledo's interpretation, this was the moment the government lost any moral authority it might hitherto have held over Jalisco. González Flores wrote:

The ire of Caesar was felt, when police on foot and horseback threw themselves against the unarmed crowd, as if they were attacking an army at war. Women, children, elderly, and young, all who had the misfortune of finding themselves within the reach of those cossacks, were beaten, trampled under charging horses, and struck with machetes.⁴³

³⁹ Rius Facius, *De Don Porfirio*, p. 108.

⁴⁰ Fondo Palomar y Vizcarra (henceforth FPYV), 41.297.3207, Alvarez Tostado to Palomar y Vizcarra, Guadalajara, 22-3 Jul. 1918; BPE, miscelánea 783.7, "Apuntes," p. 19. *El Informador*, 23 Jul. 1918, estimated more than 10,000.

⁴¹ González Flores, *Cuestión Religiosa*, pp. 321-3. FPYV, 41.297.3206, Alvarez Tostado to Palomar, Guadalajara, 22-3 Jul. 1918.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ González Flores, *Cuestión Religiosa*, p. 322; Gómez Robledo, *Anacleto González Flores*, p. 72.

Despite the repression, the protest generated a feeling of Catholic victory. Newspapers were warned not to report the incident; in protest, *La Epoca* left its front page blank except for the caption: "Silence is, after speech, the world's second power."⁴⁴ In Guadalajara, mused the Jesuit, Gómez Robledo, there was no need to put the story in writing because locals could read not only between the lines, but without them.⁴⁵

After the violent dispersal of the protest, Jalisco's legislature published an amended version of decree 1913, called decree 1927, repealing the first. Decree 1927 contained the basic content of its predecessor, but specified fines of ten to 200 pesos and imprisonment of one to 11 months for priests who did not comply.⁴⁶ Compliance meant that priests would need licences in order to minister legally to the faithful. The diocesan clergy responded by abandoning the churches, thus deploying sacred space in an *anti*-anticlerical politics.⁴⁷ On the one hand, if priests did not exercise their vocation publicly, they could dispense with licenses; the withdrawal of the cult from church, on the other hand, would stimulate lay protests and prayer, showing that the Church could not be broken by anticlerical fiat. Thus, as of 1 August, mass would not be given in Guadalajara churches.⁴⁸ For the rest of Jalisco, services would stop on 1 September.

In Guadalajara, during the final days of July, the churches swelled under the pressure of those who wished to confess, marry, baptize, or receive the Eucharist, an important, if impressionistic, indicator of popular interest in the orthodox aspects of Catholic worship. The pattern was repeated outside the capital in the days prior to 1 September. As of August, a state of mourning was observed which entailed two distinct forms of protest. The first was inward, recalling the practices of abstention observed during advent and lent. Black ribbons appeared in the windows and over the doors of homes across the city; Catholics refrained from recreation and only made purchases of basic necessity; they abstained from music and parties; they also boycotted the use of carriages, cars, and trams.⁴⁹ These practices of mourning

⁴⁴ Antonio Gomez Robledo attributed the caption, "*Le silence est, après la parole, la seconde puissance du monde*," to Félicité Robert de Lamennais (1782-1854), a French philosopher-priest who advocated democracy and Church-state separation; see Gómez Robledo, *Anacleto González Flores*, p. 73. However, the idea seems to belong not to Lamennais, but to the French diplomat Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754-1838), and may be found in his *La Confession de Talleyrand, V. 1-5, Mémoires du Prince de Talleyrand* (Paris: L. Sauvaire), 1891.

⁴⁵ Gómez Robledo, *Anacleto González Flores*, p. 73.

⁴⁶ J. Ignacio Dávila Garibi and Salvador Chavez Hayhoe, *Colección de documentos relativos a la cuestión religiosa en Jalisco* (2 vols. Guadalajara: Tip. J. M. Yguíniz, 1920), vol. 1, pp. 64-67, 74-78.

⁴⁷ *El Informador*, 2 Sep. 1918.

⁴⁸ Rius Facius, *De Don Porfirio*, p. 111.

⁴⁹ González Flores, *Cuestión religiosa*, p. 331.

were widespread in the city, in addition to the discontinuation of all activity or practice having to do with churches. Remaining as empty buildings, the churches were converted into symbols of resistance. The self-imposed distance between worshippers and their place of worship, and the relocation of the cult to primitive settings, served to strengthen Catholic resolve.

On 14 August the archdiocese published a circular for the faithful, declaring days of holy obligation for all priests and faithful on 22 August, in the Zapopan Basilica, and 23 August, in the parish church of San Pedro Tlaquepaque.⁵⁰ As customary pilgrimage sites just outside of the city limits, these churches temporarily became the material focus of Catholic identity. The masses created a modern-day pilgrimage for religious liberty, serving as a point of union and reaffirmation of Catholic identity in struggle against the civil authorities. The Catholic newspaper, *El Futuro*, published the following note:

Things continue without change in the city; the Government sustains its campaign of persecution and the Catholics [continue their] passive resistance, extremely pious in protest, during these final days of worship in the towns near Guadalajara; more than three quarters of the population has been to San Pedro and Zapopan; of course, the majority make the trip on foot, there and back.⁵¹

The article went on to comment, with a certain irony, that decree 1927 had been a blessing in disguise; it had sown a “miraculous crop” which the church would harvest.

The second part of the mourning protest was as much outwardly directed, as it was inward. The principal target was the pro-government daily, *El Occidental*, which was commonly thought by the laity systematically to misreport the news pertaining to government repression of their movements. González Flores referred to the protest as “economic sovereignty,” a term echoing the language used by Gandhi in his struggle against the British in India. It consisted of boycotting the newspaper, not only in terms of consumption, but of pressuring those who used the newspaper for advertising their businesses. Pro-Catholic newspapers, such as *La Epoca*, published an on-going list of businesses in the city that advertised in *El Occidente*. Another pro-Catholic newspaper, *La Lucha*, did the same, including a list of prominent masons in the city, whose businesses were boycotted.⁵² In weeks, *El Occidental* was forced to discontinue circulation.

⁵⁰ Dávila Garibi, *Apuntes*, vol. 5, pp. 380-385.

⁵¹ BPE, miscelánea 783/7, “Apuntes,” p. 21.

⁵² González Flores, *Cuestión religiosa*, p. 332; Rius Facius, *De Don Porfirio*, p. 270.

Concurrently with the August boycott, the governor and state legislature were bombarded with protests from rural towns and secondary cities in Jalisco. Between mid-August and mid-September, no fewer than 45 petitions were sent from 32 different towns. Although a few were sent directly to Carranza, most went to the state legislature or governor. In all, the protests carried some 35,000 signatures.

In late 1918 a new state legislature and governor were elected, clearing the way for a repeal of decree 1913/1927. Following his military leave of absence of 16 months, Diéguez returned to office on 31 January 1919, in order to give his final address as out-going governor. On 4 February 1919, the state legislature rescinded decree 1927 in a vote of 15 in favor and 5 against.⁵³

Following the repeal of decree 1927, Orozco y Jiménez wrote interior minister Manuel Aguirre Berlanga in Mexico City, to request a passport along with guarantees for his return to Guadalajara. Aguirre Berlanga granted the archbishop permission to return to Mexico, provided that he first went to Mexico City to consult with federal government officials. Thus, Orozco y Jiménez set out for Mexico City in August. On arrival at Mexico City, he wrote president Carranza and Jalisco governor Tapia. The letters are self-consciously diplomatic, stating that the archbishop would be in Mexico City for a time, and that he was a servant of both.⁵⁴ When Orozco y Jiménez finally arrived in Guadalajara in October, the celebrations were noisy and public. Men, women, and children of all classes lined the streets to greet him, shouting victory slogans. For weeks thereafter, Orozco y Jiménez received commissions from every corner of the archdiocese.⁵⁵

There is a contrast embedded in this conflict that ought to be clarified. On one hand, Church representatives, like Guadalajara's archbishop, as well as state agents, like Berlanga, and even (on occasion) Diéguez, sought out a delicate status quo in which both institutions might back away from conflict. A new factor in 1919 was that Church and state were underwritten by highly mobilized social bases. The repeal of decree 1927 and the return of Orozco y Jiménez were celebrated loudly and publicly, signaling a new Catholic offensive. Anticlerical violence would soon follow, initially through informal channels, and eventually through a newly articulated state policy. Neither Church nor state leaders could be counted on to control their social bases after 1920; furthermore, it is not always clear whether they wanted to exercise such control.

⁵³ *El Informador*, 5 Feb. 1919.

⁵⁴ Dávila Garibi, *Apuntes*, pp. 420-421.

⁵⁵ Rius Facius, *De Don Porfirio*, pp. 113-114.

ANTICLERICALISM AS STATE-BUILDING, 1923-1927

Between 1919-22, Catholic politics were dynamic and assertive: the aim was to seize control of new spaces and regain those lost in previous years. Organized laity founded workers' associations, women's and youth groups, schools, newspapers, cooperatives, and labor unions. Religious leaders returned from exile and lay leaders made their names. Meanwhile, president Obregón (1920-24) attempted to consolidate his power after the 1920 Agua Prieta rebellion, and showed a willingness to negotiate with diverse factions in an effort to end the revolution. His first overture to the Catholics was the return of church buildings, revoking closure decrees effected between 1914-19.⁵⁶ While state power remained relatively weak, anticlericalism took the form of *ad hoc* vandalism, rioting, shootings, and bombings. To some extent, this violence was independent of government policy, carried out by proxies such as *cromistas*⁵⁷ and militant agrarians.

The massification of both Catholic and revolutionary politics prompted serious clashes on the streets. The year 1921 saw three important dynamite attacks in Mexico City,⁵⁸ and serious acts of vandalism and affray in provincial capitals like Morelia.⁵⁹ In Guadalajara on labor day (1 May), revolutionary workers stormed the cathedral and flew the red and black anarcho-syndicalist flag from a bell-tower. Led by Miguel Gómez Loza, a young union leader, Catholics confronted the intruders. Gómez Loza forced his way into the belfry, where he was beaten up. For this valor, he was instantly famed as a fearless defender of the Catholic cause.⁶⁰ The Knights of Columbus decorated him and he, like Anacleto González Flores, became part of a new lay leadership espousing combative, non-violent action. His biographer—fellow activist Vicente Camberos Vizcaíno—narrated Gómez Loza's attempt to seize the flag with admiration and bestowed an epic quality on the event: although it must have been a brief episode, this retelling has become a classic of partisan Catholic historiography.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Meyer, *La cristiada*, vol. 2, pp. 111-112.

⁵⁷ Members of the Regional Confederation of Mexican Labor (CROM), a client labor central.

⁵⁸ Meyer, *La cristiada*, vol. 2, p. 113; Barry Carr, *El movimiento obrero y la política en México, 1910-1929* (Mexico City: ERA, 1991), p. 217.

⁵⁹ In Morelia, supporters of governor Francisco Mújica fired on a Catholic demonstration after anarchists vandalized a cathedral icon. Christopher R. Boyer, *Becoming Campesinos: Politics, Identity, and Agrarian Struggle in Postrevolutionary Michoacán, 1920-1935* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 104-107.

⁶⁰ Gómez Loza was executed in 1928, when he was civilian governor of *cristero*-run parts of Jalisco. *El Informador*, 21 Mar. 1928.

⁶¹ Camberos Vizcaíno, *Un hombre y una época*, pp. 306-307; Heriberto Navarrete, *Por Dios y por la patria* (Mexico City: Jus, 1973), pp. 32-35.

A month later, on 4 June, a bomb purportedly set off by the CROM exploded in Orozco y Jiménez's archiepiscopal residence in Guadalajara. In response, the ACJM formed a security team while various confessional groups—the *obreros católicos*, Knights of Columbus, *damas católicas*, and Thomas Kempfi (sic) Society—organized demonstrations. Over 4,000 marched peacefully through central Guadalajara. The Union of Catholic Workers' Syndicates (USOC) also organized a petition to demand the ouster of the police chief.⁶² In San Julián, subsequently a stronghold of the cristero rebellion, the ACJM organized a march along with members of rural trade unions and Guadalupan study circles. The organizers in San Julián selected a symbolic site for the demonstration's climax: a portal on the town plaza named after Agustín de Iturbide, Mexico's first emperor and an icon of Catholic nationalism.⁶³

The following March (1922), anti-Catholic violence escalated when the anarcho-syndicalist Revolutionary Renters' Union organized a demonstration against housing costs. The early 1920s was an era of rent strikes, and Guadalajara here followed in the footsteps of movements in Orizaba and Mexico City. Led by Jenaro Laurito, an Argentine anarchist, and Guadalajara's former police chief and Socialist Revolutionary Party (PRS) activist, Justo González, the city's *inquilinos* marched downtown, targeting their protest at specific sites. These included the offices of the Catholic newspaper, *Restauración*, and the liberal *El Informador*; the socially upscale Casino Jalisciense; and the "Club Atlas," home to a local soccer team.⁶⁴ The final destination was a church near San Francisco garden: here demonstrators harangued churchgoers leaving mass, before several began shooting at them. After the commotion, six Catholic workers lay dead.⁶⁵

The reaction to the massacre of Sunday 26 March was massive, further polarizing the different actors involved in the conflict.⁶⁶ There are several versions of what took place, but in the most common, churchgoers—consisting mostly of Catholic workers—who left mass found themselves

⁶² *El Obrero*, 11 Jun. 1921.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 25 Jun. 1921.

⁶⁴ *El Informador*, 27 Mar. 1922.

⁶⁵ *El Obrero*, 2 Apr. 1922; Moreno Ochoa, *Semblanzas revolucionarias*, pp. 39-45; Jorge Durand, "El movimiento inquilinario de Guadalajara, 1922," *Encuentro* no. 2 (1984), pp. 7-28; Jesús Gómez Fregoso, "Notas para la historia de los sindicatos católicos en Jalisco (1918-1924)," *Encuentro* no. 3 (1984), p. 62; Jaime Tamayo, *Los movimientos sociales, 1917-1929. Tomo IV. Jalisco desde la revolución* (Guadalajara: Gobierno del Estado, 1988), pp. 135-136; Cuauhtémoc Medina Carrillo and Noé Figueroa Mendoza, *Luis C. Medina y el movimiento obrero en Jalisco* (Guadalajara: Gobierno de Jalisco, 1988), pp. 63-83.

⁶⁶ *El Obrero*, 9, 16, 23 Apr., 14 May, and 18 Jun. 1922.

engulfed in a rioting crowd of anarchists. In nearly all versions, the Catholics were unarmed and provided all the casualties. The numbers involved vary: the highest figure was given by the U.S. vice-consul, who reported that 1,000 unarmed Catholics disbanded 100 armed *inquilinos* led by Laurito and González.⁶⁷

By 1923, Catholic opposition politics had achieved a level of organization and influence comparable to the high point of the National Catholic Party in 1912, but were no longer beholden to a *capitalino* clique of displaced Porfirian Catholics. Now thousands of Catholic activists faced off against pro-government labor unions and anticlerical politicians. In this broadening political context, revolutionaries such as Zuno, CROM boss Luis Morones, and Calles began anticlerical campaigns which, if nominally independent of one another, obeyed an institutional logic of state power: their goal was to shut down the public space that permitted a reinvigorated Catholic opposition politics.

An early sign of this came in the spring of 1923, when anticlerical pressure led Obregón to use the provisions of constitutional Article 33 to expel apostolic delegate Ernesto Filippi, in reprisal for participating in a pilgrimage to Cubilete peak, Guanajuato. Then, in May, Zuno entered the governor's palace in Guadalajara and proceeded to apply constitutional Article 123 through legislation proscribing confessional unions.⁶⁸ The new governor also began closing Catholic schools, convents, seminaries, union offices, and ACJM centers. Again, Catholics responded with shows of strength, but faced—as in Mexico City—rivals who were consolidated politically and increasingly determined. This was especially so after Calles assumed the presidency in December 1924. Carranza, and to a lesser extent Obregón, had avoided irretrievable clashes with the Church, and Diéguez had followed their example in 1918. By contrast, from 1924, Calles and Zuno sought a confrontation with their Catholic rivals and refused to negotiate.

It is still important to establish at precisely which moment, and through which mechanism, anticlerical action was transformed into a clear policy of state. The answer, both in Mexico City and Guadalajara, was in early 1925, after the creation of the Mexican Catholic and Apostolic Church, a schismatic body parallel to the Roman Church but characterized by its rejection of the papacy and support for Calles's nation-building project. That February, *cromistas* in the Calles government supported the schismatic priests

⁶⁷ Meyer, *La cristiada*, vol. 2, p. 121.

⁶⁸ Barbosa Guzmán, *La iglesia y el gobierno civil*, p. 272.

who occupied the church of La Soledad in Mexico City and forced the Roman *cura* to flee.⁶⁹ The forging of the schism ratcheted up the political tension and marked the beginning of the collapse of public political space.

This collapse became apparent in four distinctive, but clearly related, ways. Firstly, by putting church buildings at the heart of the conflict, the schism forced Catholics to retreat into these redoubts of their faith and defend them. The schism upped the ante and terrified Catholics because it meant not merely the punitive expropriation of churches, but their redistribution on sectarian criteria. The stakes were no longer rendered in terms of the closure of church buildings, but more starkly, in terms of whom—in the state’s view—might effectively dispose of them. In Mexico City, the faithful of La Soledad—a real *barrio bravo*—responded by rioting and reoccupying the church, which Calles then closed: it was a measure of the schism’s odiousness to Catholic opinion that this reversion to earlier anticlerical precedent was seen as the lesser of two evils.

In Jalisco, both rumored and actual state actions deeply affected Catholic militants, who had themselves been reduced to defensive tactics by Zuno’s earlier (1923) assertion of control over Catholic property. Jalisco’s political Catholics were horrified by the schismatic advance and reacted with violent indignation to the suggestion that it was the CROM—implicitly the federal regime—that backed the schismatic, or revolutionary, clergy in its church seizures.⁷⁰ Here, too, the key struggle was over church buildings. Guadalajara Catholics were particularly troubled by rumors that the city’s three most politically active parish churches—Mexicaltzingo, La Merced, and the Santuario de Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe—would be given to the schismatics. The fact that a project to expropriate these and other city churches had existed since 1918—the Ayuntamiento considered the above parishes particular bastions of “fanaticism”—lent weight to such rumors.⁷¹

If revolutionaries were unable to expropriate these parish churches, this was due to the massive protests that city Catholics made in their defense. The conflicts were now siege-like, centering on physical churches (*templos*) not pastors, as an interior ministry agent reported in Guadalajara in August 1925; and it was in these spaces that Catholics now set their defense:

⁶⁹ See Mario Ramírez Rancaño, *El patriarca Pérez. La Iglesia Católica Apostólica Mexicana* (Mexico City: UNAM, 2006).

⁷⁰ Archivo General de la Nación, Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (AGN-DGIPS), v. 228/exp. 33/f. 6, agent #9 to departamento confidencial, Mexico City, 26 Jun. 1925.

⁷¹ Archivo General Municipal de Guadalajara, año 1918, exp. 139, Gobierno to municipal president, Rivera Rosas, 1 Feb. and 5 Mar. 1918; exp. 669, Gobierno to municipal president, 27 May 1918.

Among the clergy there is great alarm because it is rumored with great insistence that the Schismatics are going to take some churches, among them El Santuario, La Merced, and Mexicalcingo [sic], and in all of them they [the Catholics] have people on daily watch, both day and night.⁷²

The agent reported that the Knights of Columbus and Union of Catholic Porters were protecting El Santuario with neighborhood backing: it had been agreed that the militants would communicate news of anticlerical attack by ringing the church bells, a signal that would call parishioners to go “violently” to defend the faith, wherever required.⁷³ The church building had become a living, material extension of the faith.

Secondly, the assault on church buildings was part of a broader state politics whose aim was to secure control of the infrastructure that allowed Catholic organizations to function. Throughout the year following the Mexico City schism, Zuno and Jalisco’s state government again strove to close and expropriate dozens of Catholic properties. Besides churches, convents, schools, union headquarters, seminaries, and association offices were all affected. This campaign caused a substantial increase in cases of Catholic affray and protest against the government; and it was matched by the widespread arrest of Catholic students and clergy, and the expulsion of seminarians, priests, and religious.

The confiscation of property that housed Catholic associations was a clear sign of the reduction of public political space. For Zuno, it was a question not merely of public order, but of driving Catholic politics to the margins: Zuno did not hesitate to order police to disperse Catholics by shooting over their heads, or to have firemen disperse them with powerful cannonades of water. He also closed the preparatory and theological seminaries in the neighborhood of Analco, on grounds of hygiene.⁷⁴ Catholics resisted: a new theological seminary was improvised as well as a preparatory seminary. Once these seminaries were opened, Zuno again ordered the police to dislodge the seminarians: resistance was met with beatings, gunshots, and hosepipe blasts from the city’s firemen.⁷⁵ The ACJM’s reaction to the loss of its Guadalajara office, located in the city center, was combative: the *acejotaemeros* moved their activities to the San Francisco gardens, turning their day-to-day business into a public demonstration with clear political intentions.⁷⁶

⁷² AGN-DGIPS, v. 244/exp. 10/f. 11, agent #24 (Eduardo Sánchez Aldana) to departamento confidencial, Guadalajara, 16-22 Aug. 1925.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ *El Informador*, 23 Dec. 1924.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 28, 29, and 30 Jul. 1925.

⁷⁶ Rius Facius, *De Don Porfirio*, pp. 270-271.

Thirdly, a reduction in the space available for public communication accompanied the policy of controlling Catholicism's formal sites. In 1925, Catholic newspapers were closed: the newly-formed National League of Religious Defense (LNDR) responded by cultivating good relations with newspapers considered neutral or sympathetic;⁷⁷ and posters, flyers, and bulletins started to appear. Zuno's closing of pro-Catholic newspapers pushed the confessional opposition press underground: the surprisingly vocal national press would also be partially gagged by the middle years of callismo.⁷⁸

To this anticlericalism, fourthly, should be added a growing intolerance, born perhaps of the delahuertista rebellion and intended—as in 1914—to eliminate the revolution's political rivals. In early 1926, an interior ministry agent described Zuno's political consolidation in terms of murders, incarcerations, extortion, and corruption. Agrarian communities that disobeyed the regime, for instance, found that their seeds were sequestered or their leaders locked up and either fined or bribed with cash gifts; if resistance was noted, one or two agrarians would be shot, and the leaders called in to restate their obedience. The tightest political control was employed in Guadalajara, the agent wrote, where “all oppositionist [sic] political activity to C[itizen] Governor Zuno has been suffocated.”⁷⁹ It bears repeating that these were not the words of a Catholic militant but of an agent of the interior ministry; and it is also worth asking what kind of relationship Zuno had with Jalisco's agraristas, since it was these that he was to arm and mobilize against the Catholics. The agent's report offers two answers: bribery and coercion.

In 1925-26, detentions of clergy and laity associated with political Catholicism were also common. Nonetheless, as long as Catholics continued to seek out means of political communication, it was hard for anticlericals to impose themselves completely. The women teachers of Mexico City's Colegio de las Vizcaínas provide us with a symbol of Catholics' creative appropriation of public space. Despite the best efforts of the interior ministry and several police corps, who discovered the plan beforehand, the women organized a group of *Liga* sympathizers and released 600 balloons filled

⁷⁷ Early propaganda referred to the movement as the Liga Nacional de Defensa Religiosa (LNDR); in 1926, the acronym LNDLR (Liga Nacional Defensora de la Libertad Religiosa) was adopted. It was commonly referred to simply as the *Liga*.

⁷⁸ As Meyer reminds us, the press was quite free in the first two years of callismo, as seen in the near-universal condemnation of the schism. After this, censorship became routine. Jean Meyer, *Historia de la revolución mexicana, 1924-1928: estado y sociedad con Calles* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1977), pp. 105-106.

⁷⁹ AGN-DGIPS, v. 2046-C/exp. 5/f. 10, report to departamento confidencial, Mexico City, 11 Feb. 1926.

with Catholic propaganda. Printed on india paper in the colors of the Mexican flag, the small sheets rained down in green, white, and red once the balloons burst overhead, in December 1926.⁸⁰ As the political space was closed to them, Catholics increasingly adopted the propaganda tactics of guerrilla warfare, and finally guerrilla warfare itself.

In consequence, the distinction between militants and sympathizers became tenuous. The organization of religious defense committees was of central importance to this transformation. The Zuno government declared Catholic syndicalism to be illegal: in reply, by 1925, Anacleto González Flores and his allies restructured Catholic unions and other associations through the Popular Union (*Unión Popular* or UP), stressing the basic goal of religious self-defense. As noted, the Liga was founded in Mexico City that year. Even though Catholics were by now reacting to state policy, clearly they could still create large-scale forms of protest. Even on the defensive, Catholics could fill the streets. Soon it would become a question of whether or not lay Catholic leaders were willing to act independently of the clergy⁸¹ and to compete with revolutionaries for political space.

While the Liga conducted its political campaign to undermine *callismo*, it also planned its rebellion from Mexico City.⁸² In Jalisco, the Popular Union adapted the institutional bases of the National Catholic Labor Confederation and worked in more decentralized fashion, severing the institutional channels that kept rural groups tied to Guadalajara. Antonio Gómez Robledo describes the UP's organization as follows:

Block, zone, parish: the person responsible for each of these constituencies [*circunscripciones*] was in close contact with his subordinates and his immediate superior. Ceremony, solemnity, and protocol were absent; there were almost no books, nor were letters sent. Paperwork was replaced by the efficacy of personal communication.⁸³

In the end, revolutionary anticlericalism destroyed the political spaces in which Catholics had organized themselves, and erased the practical distinc-

⁸⁰ AGN-DGIPS, v. 228/exp. 33/f. 1, oficina confidencial to agente #19, Mexico City, 3 Dec. 1926; to agent José I. Curiel, Mexico City, 3 Dec. 1926; Francisco M. Delgado to Inspector General de Policía, Jefe de la Policía Judicial Federal, and Jefe de la Policía del Distrito, Mexico City, 3 Dec. 1926; *El Universal*, 5 Dec. 1926.

⁸¹ Even government spies reported that the movement was not organized by clergy but by prominent Catholics; see AGN-DGIPS, v. 228/exp. 33/f. 1, agente especial #7 to departamento confidencial, Mexico City, 20 Jan. 1927.

⁸² AGN-DGIPS, v. 228/exp. 33/f. 5, agente #18 to departamento confidencial, Mexico City, 7 Apr. 1925; v. 228/exp. 33/f. 2, oficial primero to Gobernación, Mexico City, n/d.

⁸³ Gómez Robledo, *Anacleto González Flores*, p. 135.

tion between militants and neutrals. In this context, it made sense to a growing number of Catholic militants to take the step from politics to rebellion. The precise moment is described by Heriberto Navarrete, who worked closely with González Flores in the UP. In December 1926, Navarrete wrote, local (parish) leaders of the UP met in Guadalajara to elect a new leadership for 1927. At the general assembly, which was held clandestinely, a Liga motion to rebel against Calles was discussed. Local leaders were asked to return to their parishes and decide whether to heed the call to arms, even though the UP's constitution obliged the organization to abstain from military activity. As secretary general, Navarrete wrote that almost immediately it became clear that such a distinction between civic and armed resistance was untenable. If there were to be a rebellion, the UP would be swept into civil war by its social base. In the most poignant passage of his memoir, Navarrete recounted a conversation with a local UP leader, who said to him: "I don't get it, you mean we are going to fight, while you are going to watch us? Is it because you are scared?" Navarrete later convinced González Flores that if the UP's local leadership went to war, then there was no other path for its directorate but to follow suit.⁸⁴

CONCLUSION

The armed phase of the 1910 revolution radicalized the anticlerical sentiments of leaders like Diéguez. It also produced a well-organized Catholic opposition and destroyed the conciliatory politics of Church and state that characterized the Porfiriato. In the civil wars that ensued, however, anticlericalism was often the expression of political tactics, exercised in a context of the multiple sovereignties that rushed into the vacuum left by the collapse of the Porfirian state.⁸⁵ Only with the reestablishment of state institutions did a coherent anticlerical policy appear; but even then, government fiat was initially not strong enough to impose such a policy where locals opposed it.

The reestablishment of a more or less well-defined political arena after 1916 also provided a set of ground rules through which political opposition could be expressed. In this context, revolutionary anticlericalism's relative weakness *circa* 1919-22 underwrote the tentative legitimacy of an emerging state. The de la Huerta revolt (1923-24) destroyed this legitimacy. After the rebellion, revolutionaries such as Calles and Zuno were less willing to tol-

⁸⁴ Navarrete, *Por Dios y por la patria*, pp. 119-125.

⁸⁵ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

erate political opposition and acted quickly to marginalize it. In Jalisco, this intolerance translated into strongly anticlerical policies directed less at the clergy and more at political Catholics. In shutting out political opposition in this way, Zuno took anticlericalism out of the traditional arena—attacking clerical privilege—and used it to close down the political space created by Mexico's 1917 revolutionary constitution.

The end result was the cristero rebellion, but it is unhelpful to think of this simply as a violent Church-state cleavage, as may be seen through a Gobernación report from Jamay, Jalisco, dating from the first weeks of serious fighting in 1927.⁸⁶ In Jamay, a town on the shores of Lake Chapala, we see a break within the government, one which opposed local and national authority. Here the entire local government was driven to rebel against the state's religious policy by the anticlericalism of Zuno and Calles. What a government spy found here in February 1927 was not factional politics. Rather, everyone in town, including the mayor, belonged to the UP and openly opposed Calles and Zuno. This, essentially, was a local, counter-hegemonic movement, articulated through and by the organisms and representatives of the post-revolutionary state.

The case of Jamay is significant because it helps us to understand several key questions. Most obviously, it reveals the extent to which state-sanctioned anticlericalism could (or could not) limit popular sovereignty; and second, it highlights the depth of pro-Catholic sentiment in Jalisco prior to and during the cristero revolt.⁸⁷ There is a third, much more significant question in all of this, however, which should be of general interest to historians: the extent to which conflicts between anticlerical revolutionaries and political Catholics forged both a new politico-religious Catholic identity and shaped revolutionary practice, thus contributing to the construction of the political sphere of post-revolutionary Mexico. Such conflicts suggest that tactical and institutional anticlericalism were crucial to shaping the development of a modern system of political representation during the 1910s and 1920s in Mexico.

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⁸⁶ AGN-DGIPS, v. 244/exp. 4/f. 2, José Y. Ponce to Francisco M. Delgado, Guadalajara, 21 Feb. 1927.

⁸⁷ AGN-DGIPS, v. 244/exp. 4/f. 2, oficial mayor to state governor, Mexico City, 8 Mar. 1927.